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DHS V. REGENTS OF THE
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA:
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CONCERNS
IN REPEALING DACA
CHARLES FENDRYCH∗
INTRODUCTION
On its surface, deferred action is simple: it is a decision by Executive
Branch officials to postpone deportation proceedings against an
individual or group that is otherwise eligible to be removed from the
United States.1 Deferred action is an exercise of the Executive’s
inherent authority to manage its policies, but is not expressly grounded
in statute.2 Despite this lack of statutory authority, Congress and the
Supreme Court have historically recognized deferred action policies.
Indeed, records of such Executive discretion date back to the early
twentieth century.3 The Executive, grounding its justification in
humanitarian concerns, has continued to institute categorical deferred
action programs well into the modern era.4 Perhaps the most wellknown example of such a program is the deferred action policy known
as Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (“DACA”).
This Commentary evaluates the administrative law issues presented
by the upcoming case DHS v. Regents of the University of California,
which concerns the 2017 rescission of DACA.5 Importantly, this
Commentary does not evaluate the legality of DACA itself or argue
that DACA cannot be rescinded as a matter of Executive discretion.
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1. Regents of Univ. Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 908 F.3d 476, 487 (9th Cir. 2018).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. See id. at 489 (noting the implementation of deferred action for victims under the
Violence Against Women Act, victims of human trafficking, foreign students unable to fulfill their
visa requirements following Hurricane Katrina, and widowed spouses of U.S. citizens who had
been married for less than two years).
5. 139 S. Ct. 2779 (mem.) (2019).
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Instead, the focus is on whether the way in which the policy was
rescinded was appropriate. The primary challenge to the rescission’s
legality is that DHS based the rescission on a determination that
maintaining DACA was illegal—instead of rescinding it on policy
grounds.6 For various reasons, this distinction arguably opens the
rescission to judicial review and even places its legality in question.7 In
order to evaluate these concerns, the Supreme Court must first consider
whether the rescission is subject to judicial review; if review is
appropriate, the Court must then determine whether the Executive’s
decision to rescind DACA was arbitrary and capricious under the
Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”).8
I. FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
In 2012, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”)
announced a policy known as DACA.9 DACA provides that eligible
individuals brought to the U.S. as children may apply for discretionary
relief from removal, despite not having lawful immigration status.10 To
apply, an applicant must: meet certain age restrictions, have maintained
continuous residence in the U.S. since 2007, and be a current student, a
high school graduate or equivalent, or an honorably discharged service
member.11 In addition, to qualify an applicant cannot have a significant
criminal record or pose a threat to national security or public safety.12
If approved, deportation proceedings against the individual are
deferred for two years, subject to renewal.13 Approval does not,
however, confer lawful immigration status: deferral can be revoked and
does not provide a pathway to citizenship.14

6. See infra Part IV.B.
7. Id.
8. Regents of Univ. Cal., 908 F.3d at 510.
9. Brief for Respondents the Regents of the Univ. of Cal., Janet Napolitano, and the City
of San José at 4–5, Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of Univ. Cal., 139 S. Ct. 2779 (mem.) (filed
Sept. 27, 2019) (Nos. 18-587, 18-588, and 18-589) [hereinafter Brief for the Respondents].
10. Id. at 5.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Brief for the Petitioners at 5, Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of Univ. Cal., 139 S.
Ct. 2779 (mem.) (filed Aug. 19, 2019) (Nos. 18-587, 18-588, and 18-589) [hereinafter Brief for the
Petitioners].
14. Id.
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In 2014, DHS announced plans to expand DACA and to create a
new deferred action policy called Deferred Action for Parents of
Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents (“DAPA”).15 Under the
expanded DACA policy, DHS planned to ease the age and residency
requirements and increase the period of deferred action from two years
to three years.16 Similarly, DAPA was designed to provide DACA-like
protections to undocumented parents whose children were U.S. citizens
or lawful permanent residents.17
In response, Texas and twenty-five other states brought suit to
prevent DHS from implementing DAPA and expanding DACA.18 In
Texas v. United States (Texas I), the Southern District of Texas granted
a nationwide preliminary injunction.19 The Fifth Circuit affirmed in
Texas v. United States (Texas II),20 holding that DAPA and the
expansions to DACA did not allow for sufficiently individualized
review of applicants and were enacted without proper notice under the
APA.21 The Supreme Court affirmed in United States v. Texas (Texas
III),22 but was equally divided and did not issue an opinion.23 Following
this decision, the petitioners from this line of cases (“the Texas cases”)
announced their intention to amend their complaint and challenge
DACA in its entirety.24
In 2017, Attorney General Jeff Sessions advised DHS to rescind
DACA because the policy’s effectuation was unconstitutional.25 In the
“Sessions Letter,” Sessions warned then-Acting Secretary of
Homeland Security Elaine Duke that leaving DACA in place risked
litigation that would mirror Texas II and III “[b]ecause the DACA
policy has the same legal and constitutional defects that the courts
recognized as to DAPA.”26

15. Id.
16. Id. at 6.
17. Id.
18. Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 13, at 6.
19. 86 F. Supp. 3d 591, 677 (S.D. Tex. 2015).
20. 809 F.3d 134, 188 (5th Cir. 2015).
21. Id. at 175–78.
22. 136 S. Ct. 2271, 2272 (2016) (mem.) (per curiam).
23. Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 13, at 7.
24. Id.
25. LETTER FROM ATTORNEY GENERAL SESSIONS TO ACTING SECRETARY DUKE
(September 4, 2017), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/17_0904_DOJ_AGletter-DACA.pdf [hereinafter Sessions Letter].
26. Id.
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The next day, Acting Secretary Duke issued the “Duke
Memorandum” rescinding DACA.27 The Duke Memorandum
instructed DHS to stop accepting new DACA applications and limited
renewal applications.28 Notably, the memorandum justified the
rescission in just one sentence: “[t]aking into consideration the
Supreme Court’s and the Fifth Circuit’s rulings in [the Texas cases], and
the September 4, 2017 letter from the Attorney General, it is clear that
the June 15, 2012 DACA program should be terminated.”29
B. Procedural History
Following DACA’s rescission, various plaintiffs (“Regents”) filed
suit against DHS in the Northern District of California, the District of
Columbia, the District of Maryland, and the Eastern District of New
York.30
First, Regents argued that DHS’s rescission of DACA was
reviewable.31 The reviewability was in question because agency
enforcement decisions are typically left to an agency’s own discretion.32
Here, however, each court held that the rescission was subject to review
because DHS’s actions were not based on policy considerations, which
are normally granted deference.33 Instead, the rescission was premised
solely on DACA’s supposed illegality, which the courts found to be a
reviewable legal determination.34
Second, Regents argued that the rescission was arbitrary and
capricious in violation of the APA.35 In Regents of University of
California v. DHS36 and Batalla Vidal v. Trump,37 the New York and
California district courts held that the rescission was likely arbitrary
and capricious and issued identical preliminary injunctions.38
27. Brief for the Respondents, supra note 9, at 9.
28. MEMORANDUM ON RESCISSION OF DEFERRED ACTION FOR CHILDHOOD ARRIVALS
(DACA) (September 5, 2017), https://www.dhs.gov/news/2017/09/05/memorandum-rescissiondaca [hereinafter Duke Memorandum].
29. Id.
30. Brief for the Respondents, supra note 9, at 10–13.
31. Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 13, at 8–9.
32. Id. at 9.
33. Id.
34. See, e.g., Brief for the Respondents, supra note 9, at 11–12 (discussing how the Ninth
Circuit held that agency actions based solely on the belief that any other action was foreclosed by
law are not considered discretionary and are not granted deference); see infra Part III.
35. Id. at 8–9.
36. 279 F. Supp. 3d 1011, 1049–50 (N.D. Cal. 2018).
37. 279 F. Supp. 3d 401, 438 (E.D.N.Y. 2018).
38. Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 13, at 9.
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Additionally, both courts found that the rescission violated the APA
because the administrative record explaining DHS’s rationale was
incomplete.39 Similarly, in NAACP v. Trump,40 the D.C. district court
found that the rescission was arbitrary and capricious because DHS’s
stated rationale was insufficient to explain the change.41 However,
rather than issuing an injunction, the district court issued a stay, giving
DHS ninety days to better explain its original decision or issue a new
decision with a clearer rationale.42
Within ninety days, then-Secretary of Homeland Security Kirstjen
Nielsen issued the “Nielsen Memorandum” to the general public,
describing several reasons for the rescission.43 First, Nielsen explained
that rescinding DACA was justified because DHS should not adopt
non-enforcement policies for broad classes of aliens.44 Second, DHS
should use its discretionary non-enforcement only on an individualized
basis.45 Third, DHS needed to “project a message” that it will
consistently and transparently enforce immigration law.46 After
considering the Nielsen Memorandum, the D.C. district court issued a
preliminary injunction against DHS.47 The court reasoned that, like the
Duke Memorandum, the Nielsen Memorandum was based on the
Texas cases and Attorney General Sessions’s view that DACA was not
legal.48 Therefore the Nielsen Memorandum was not sufficient to
explain the change.49
Several months later, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the injunction
against DHS in Regents of the University of California v. U.S.
Department of Homeland Security.50 First, the court affirmed that the
rescission was reviewable, holding that agency actions based solely on

39. Brief for the Respondents, supra note 9, at 55.
40. 298 F. Supp. 3d 209, 241 (D.D.C. 2018).
41. Brief for the States of N.Y., Mass., Wash., Colo., Conn., Del., Haw., Ill., Iowa, N.M.,
N.C., Or., Pa., R.I., Vt., and Va., and the District of Columbia, Respondents in No. 18-589 at 12,
Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of Univ. Cal., 139 S. Ct. 2779 (mem.) (filed Sept. 27, 2019)
(Nos. 18-587, 18-588, and 18-589) [hereinafter Brief for the Respondents in No. 18-589].
42. Id.
43. Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 13, at 10.
44. MEMORANDUM FROM SECRETARY KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN (June 22, 2018),
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/18_0622_S1_Memorandum_DACA.pdf
[hereinafter Nielsen Memorandum].
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 13, at 12.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. 908 F.3d 476, 510 (9th Cir. 2018).
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the belief that any other action was foreclosed to them by law are not
discretionary and are not granted deference.51 Second, the court
affirmed that the rescission was arbitrary and capricious in violation of
the APA.52 In doing so, the Ninth Circuit refused to consider the
Nielsen Memorandum, viewing it as an impermissible post hoc
rationalization.53
In November 2018, DHS filed a petition for certiorari in Regents,
and sought certiorari before judgment in NAACP and Batalla Vidal.54
In June 2019, the Supreme Court granted certiorari for all three.55
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. The Reviewability of Agency Actions Under the Administrative
Procedure Act
Regents contend that DHS’s rescission of DACA is reviewable
under the APA’s provision that “[a] person suffering legal wrong
because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency
action . . . is entitled to judicial review thereof.”56 Interpreting this, the
Supreme Court has consistently articulated a strong presumption that
agency actions will be subject to judicial review.57 Nevertheless, this
presumption is rebuttable and fails when it is clear from a statute that
Congress intended the agency to address such concerns internally.58
Specifically, APA § 701(a)(2) provides that judicial review is foreclosed
to the extent that “agency action is committed to agency discretion by
law.”59 However, this exception is construed narrowly and only applies
where “statutes are drawn in such broad terms that in a given case there

51. Id.
52. Id. For a more in-depth discussion of the Ninth Circuit’s holding, see infra Part III.
53. Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 13, at 13.
54. Brief for the Respondents, supra note 9, at 14.
55. Id.
56. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2012).
57. See, e.g., Mach Mining, LLC v. EEOC, 135 S. Ct. 1645, 1651 (2015) (quoting Bowen v.
Mich. Acad. of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 670 (1986)); INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 298–99
(2001); Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 190 (1995) (applying this presumption in the immigration
context).
58. Mach Mining, 135 S. Ct. at 1651.
59. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (2012).
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is no law to apply.”60 Courts still decide any and all relevant legal
questions.61
In Heckler v. Chaney, the Supreme Court clarified that the §
701(a)(2) exception encompasses an agency’s discretionary decision
not to investigate, enforce, or prosecute the substantive law.62 Such a
decision is generally committed to an agency’s absolute discretion
unless Congress has indicated otherwise.63 The Court found a
“tradition” of extending deference to such decisions as they often
involve a “complicated balancing of factors which are peculiarly within
[the agency’s] expertise.”64 Additionally, the Court noted that agency
inaction generally does not impose coercive power on the rights of
individuals and typically needs less judicial review.65
In Chaney, the Supreme Court explicitly chose not to answer
whether “a refusal by [an] agency to institute proceedings based solely
on the belief that it lacks jurisdiction” would be subject to review under
§ 701(a)(2).66 The answer is relevant because how an agency interprets
its jurisdiction is no different from how an agency interprets the scope
of its authority.67 The Supreme Court has never decided the issue,
though some circuit courts have determined that such decisions are
reviewable.68
ICC v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers69 (“BLE”) debatably
clarifies Chaney’s lack of guidance.70 In BLE, the Supreme Court held
that highlighting a reviewable rationale put forth by an agency taking
60. Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971) (quoting S. REP.
NO. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 26 (1954)); see also Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 830 (1985)
(“[R]eview is not to be had if the statute is drawn so that a court would have no meaningful
standard against which to judge the agency’s exercise of discretion.”).
61. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012).
62. 470 U.S. 821, 837–38 (1985).
63. Id.
64. Id. at 831–32.
65. Id. at 832.
66. Id. at 833 n.4 (emphasis added).
67. See City of Arlington v. F.C.C., 569 U.S. 290, 296–97 (noting that an “agency’s
interpretation of . . . the scope of [its] authority” is no different from an interpretation of “its
jurisdiction”).
68. See, e.g., Mont. Air Chapter No. 29 v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 898 F.2d 753, 754 (9th
Cir. 1990) (holding that Chaney’s presumption of nonreviewability “may be overcome if the
refusal is based solely on the erroneous belief that the agency lacks jurisdiction”); Int’l
Longshoremen’s Ass’n v. Nat’l Mediation Bd., 785 F.2d 1098, 1100 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (holding that
agency nonenforcement decisions are reviewable when they are based on a belief that the agency
lacks jurisdiction).
69. 482 U.S. 270 (1987).
70. Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 13, at 25–26; contra Brief for the Respondents, supra
note 9, at 24–25.
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action that is otherwise unreviewable does not impact the action’s
reviewability.71 For example, questionable reasons behind an agency’s
action will not bear on the action’s reviewability if taking the action
falls within a tradition of nonreviewability.72 What matters is the
agency’s formal action, not how the decision was made.73 In BLE, the
Court held that an agency decision not to reconsider a final action was
otherwise unreviewable.74 As in Chaney, the Court reasoned that the
action fell within a “tradition of nonreviewability.”75
B. The Rescission’s Legality
1. Legality under the APA
Regents also challenge DHS’s rescission of DACA under the
APA’s requirement that agency action be held unlawful and set aside
if it is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or not otherwise in
accordance with the law.”76 This consideration is made with review of
the whole record or, at minimum, those parts that refer to the action’s
rationale.77 This is a narrow scope of review and courts are not meant
to simply override an agency’s judgement.78 Nevertheless, the agency’s
action must be the product of “reasoned decisionmaking [sic].”79 An
agency must be able to articulate a satisfactory explanation that
demonstrates consideration of relevant factors without any clear error
in judgment.80 There must be a rational connection between these
factors and the action taken.81 Moreover, the explanation must be clear
enough to be understandable.82 These criteria are meant to check that
agencies offer genuine justifications for their actions and ensure that

71. BLE, 482 U.S. at 283.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 281.
74. Id. at 282.
75. Id.
76. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012); see also SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 94 (1943) (“[A]n order
may not stand if the agency has misconceived the law.”).
77. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012).
78. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983).
79. Id. at 52.
80. Id. at 42–43.
81. Id. at 43 (quoting Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168
(1962)).
82. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196–97 (1947).
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the Executive remains accountable to the courts and the general
public.83
2. Legality of Post Hoc Justifications in the Common Law
Regents argue the Nielsen Memorandum should be excluded as an
impermissible post hoc rationalization because administrative law
requires that courts consider only the agency’s contemporaneous
explanation when reviewing an agency’s action.84 Accordingly, these
determinations must be made by considering only the existing
administrative record.85 Under a narrow exception to this rule, a court
can “remand to the agency for a fuller explanation of the agency’s
reasoning at the time of the agency action.”86 However, the court may
only do this to clarify the agency’s reasoning when “there was such
failure to explain administrative action as to frustrate effective judicial
reviw.”87 Once the reason behind the action is identified, any
subsequent explanation cannot cite additional rationales.88
Martin v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission
states that an agency official’s interpretation of the agency’s own
regulation can be a form of agency action—”not a post hoc
rationalization”—and is therefore permissible.89 For example, in
Martin, the relevant statute granted the Secretary of Labor the power
to interpret the meaning of the agency’s rules.90 Therefore, the Court
deferred to the Secretary’s “reasonable” interpretation of an
ambiguous regulation, considering it agency action.91
III. HOLDING
This section focuses on the holding of the Ninth Circuit because it
was the only circuit court to rule before certiorari was granted. The
Supreme Court granted certiorari before judgment in Batalla Vidal and

83. See Dep’t of Commerce v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2575–76 (2019) (stating that
agency rationales must be clear enough to ensure that agencies put forth “genuine justifications
for important decisions . . . that can be scrutinized by courts and the general public”).
84. Id. at 2573; see also Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 169
(1962) (stating if agency action is to be upheld, it should be “on the same basis articulated in the
order by the agency itself”).
85. Dep’t of Commerce, 139 S. Ct. at 2573.
86. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 654 (1990).
87. Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142–43 (1973).
88. Id. at 143.
89. 499 U.S. 144, 156–57 (1991).
90. Id. at 152.
91. Id. at 158–59.
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NAACP, in which both the Second Circuit and the D.C. Circuit Court
had heard oral arguments on appeal but had not yet rendered
decisions.92 However, the Supreme Court granted certiorari after the
Ninth Circuit issued its ruling in Regents.93
The Ninth Circuit upheld the district court’s injunction against the
rescission of DACA.94 The court concluded that Chaney’s protections
against judicial review did not apply when an agency acted solely out
of the belief that it had no other legal option.95 This conclusion, paired
with the APA’s strong presumption towards judicial review, guided the
court’s determination that DACA’s rescission was reviewable.96 The
court determined that the Acting Secretary based the rescission solely
on an incorrect belief that DACA was illegal.97 Because the court
determined that DACA’s creation was a permissible exercise of
executive discretion, any rationale for the rescission that was based on
DACA’s illegality was found to be insufficient.98 Therefore, DHS’s
actions likely satisfied the arbitrary and capricious claim and fulfilled
the criteria for an injunction.99 The court dismissed arguments
concerning notice-and-comment rulemaking under the APA.100
IV. ARGUMENTS
A. Petitioner’s Arguments
1. The Rescission is not Reviewable
First, DHS argues rescission is not judicially reviewable because,
under the APA, such action was “committed to agency discretion by
law.”101 The decision to rescind DACA falls within a tradition of agency
discretion, given the similarities between the current case and
Chaney.102 Here, DHS’s decision to retain DACA (a policy of nonenforcement) is akin to the decision in Chaney to adopt a policy of non-

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Brief for the Respondents in No. 18-589, supra note 41, at 13.
Id.
Regents of Univ. Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 908 F.3d 476, 520 (9th Cir. 2018).
Id. at 497.
Id. at 497–98.
Id. at 503.
Id. at 510.
Regents of Univ. Cal., 908 F.3d at 510–12.
Id. at 512–18.
Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 13, at 17 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012)).
Id. at 18.
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enforcement.103 Both decisions require “complicated balancing” within
the particular expertise of an agency.104 They merit balancing given the
wide range of acceptable considerations, which include the proper
allocation of resources and overall agency policies.105 Additionally, the
abandonment a nonenforcement policy lacks a final adverse order and
thus does not invoke the agency’s coercive power, reducing the need
for judicial oversight.106 Given that the decision to rescind DACA was
committed to agency discretion by law, there are no relevant legal
considerations for the court absent a statutory directive circumscribing
DHS’s traditional discretion.107
Second, DHS believes that BLE resolves Chaney’s decision not to
rule on the reviewability of agency decisions based solely on the belief
that other courses of action are foreclosed to the agency by law.108 Here,
Chaney’s gap is irrelevant because BLE states that agency actions that
fall within a “tradition of nonreviewability” are not made reviewable
simply because the agency gives an otherwise reviewable justification
for taking the action.109 Even if DHS’s stated rationale for rescinding
DACA is in question, the action itself was committed to agency
discretion, so the rationale has no bearing on its reviewability.110
2. The Rescission was Legal
First, DHS argues that a fair reading of the Duke Memorandum
shows that the rescission was never based solely on a legal conclusion
that DACA was illegal.111 Instead, the decision was justified by DHS’s
“serious doubts about the lawfulness of the policy and the litigation
risks in maintaining it.”112 DHS was not confident in the legality of
DACA following the repeal of DAPA and feared that maintaining a
legally questionable policy could undermine public confidence in
DHS.113

103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Id. at 19.
Id. (quoting Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985)).
Id. at 22.
Id. at 19.
Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 13, at 19.
Id. at 23–25.
Id. at 23.
Id.
Id. at 26.
Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 13, at 33.
Id.
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Second, DHS argues that the Nielsen Memorandum further
articulates these reasons and should be considered.114 DHS asserts that
the Nielsen Memorandum is not a post hoc rationalization because it is
the Acting Secretary explaining her own reasoning and therefore “is
agency action.”115 Additionally, the policy arguments in the Nielsen
Memorandum adequately justify rescission on their own.116
B. Respondents’ Arguments
1. The Rescission is Reviewable
Regents argue that the rescission of DACA is reviewable given the
“strong presumption” that administrative actions are subject to judicial
review.117 Additionally, agency action based solely on the belief that any
other course of action was foreclosed as a matter of law is not an
exercise of agency discretion and is not granted deference.118 Regents
argue that this is not an instance where there is no “law to apply”
because the entirety of DHS’s argument relies on interpreting and
applying the Texas cases.119 By relying on judicial decisions, DHS places
responsibility on the courts to determine what the law is.120 The courts
are well equipped to address DACA’s legality and the APA provides
that the courts are to decide such questions of law.121 Accordingly,
agency action premised solely on the belief that such action was
required by law cannot fall within the APA’s narrow § 701(a)(2)
exception from judicial review because there is no tradition
demonstrating that such action is “committed to agency discretion by
law.”122
In distinguishing Chaney and BLE, Regents note that Chaney
involved specific enforcement proceedings and describe the action as
only involving a “one-time enforcement decision,” which is different
from the ongoing, widespread effects of rescinding DACA.123 First,

114. Id. at 28.
115. Id. at 29 (emphasis original). For an example of when agency explanations are agency
action, see supra Part II.B.2.
116. Id. at 37–42.
117. Brief for the Respondents, supra note 9, at 17 (quoting Weyerhauser Co. v. U.S. Fish &
Wildlife Serv., 139 S. Ct. 361, 370 (2018)).
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 20 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012)).
122. Id. at 18 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (2012)).
123. Brief for the Respondents, supra note 9, at 22.
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there is no established tradition of non-reviewability for programmatic
policy decisions.124 Second, the rescission implements an agency’s
coercive power, unlike in Chaney. Third, Chaney explicitly does not
apply to agency decisions based solely on the belief that the action was
required by law.125 Lastly, Regents reject DHS’s interpretation of BLE
as too broad.126 BLE is “narrow” and limited to “recognized
categor[ies] of traditionally unreviewable agency action,” which do not
include the decision to rescind DACA.127
Regents contend that the Nielsen Memorandum is an
impermissible post hoc rationalization and that, regardless, Nielsen’s
rationales do not adequately explain the rescission.128 When reviewing
agency actions, courts are limited to the reasons the agency gave when
it took the action in question.129 Agencies cannot alter the rationale for
their actions amidst review, because otherwise “agencies could render
briefs, oral argument, and even lower court opinions obsolete by issuing
post hoc documents unsupported by the administrative record.”130
These concerns are especially relevant when, as in this case, the record
is incomplete, because agencies could potentially continuously change
their rationale while withholding the materials considered by the
original decisionmaker.131 Either way, the Nielsen Memorandum does
not impact reviewability because the rescission does not fall within a
traditionally unreviewable category, and under the APA agency actions
are reviewed for “abuse of discretion.”132
2. The Rescission was Illegal
First, Regents contend that the rescission of DACA was illegal
because it was arbitrary and capricious and therefore in violation of the
APA.133 The rescission was not adequately explained because DHS
failed to clearly disclose the grounds on which the decision was made
or offer a satisfactory explanation for the rescission.134 The one124. Id. at 23 (noting that DACA’s rescission is programmatic because it impacts nearly
700,000 people and has widespread indirect effects).
125. Id. at 24.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 25.
128. Id. at 26–30.
129. Brief for the Respondents, supra note 9, at 27.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 28.
132. Id. at 27.
133. Id. at 31.
134. Id. (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 463
U.S. 29, 43 (1983)).
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sentence explanation in the Duke Memorandum is both superficial and
inadequate because there is no explanation of how or why the cited
sources led to the rescission of DACA.135
Second, Regents further contend that the Nielsen Memorandum is
a post hoc rationalization and should not be considered, but that, even
if considered, it does not cure the defects in the rescission’s
explanation.136 The legal and policy rationales put forward by the
Nielsen Memorandum “are largely a repackaging of the rationale that
DACA is unlawful.”137 The only rationale that does not depend on
DACA’s legality is that DHS needed to “project a message” that they
will enforce immigration laws.138 This justification is insufficient,
unreasonable, and lacking in any support from the administrative
record.139 Regents also note that hundreds of thousands of people living
in the U.S. rely on DACA.140
Lastly, Regents argue that the administrative record is incomplete,
which constitutes a violation of the APA.141 It is implausible that
DACA was rescinded “based on nothing more than a handful of
judicial opinions and other public documents.”142 Without access to all
of the evidence and the analysis behind the rescission, courts are unable
to determine whether the decision was arbitrary and capricious.143 This
is especially concerning given evidence that the explanation provided
by DHS may have been pretextual.144

135. Brief for the Respondents, supra note 9, at 32–33.
136. Id. at 37.
137. Id. at 38.
138. Nielsen Memorandum, supra note 46, at 3.
139. Brief for the Respondents, supra note 9, at 39.
140. Id. at 40–41.
141. Id. at 55.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 56.
144. Id. (noting that Jeff Session’s announcement of the rescission stated that DACA “denies
Americans jobs and contributes to crime” and that President Donald Trump indicated that
DACA would be rescinded unless funding was received for a border wall with Mexico, neither of
which are cited in DHS’s reasoning behind the rescission); see also Donald Trump
(@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Dec. 29, 2017, 5:16 AM), https://goo.gl/aZ19im (“The
Democrats have been told, and fully understand, that there can be no DACA without the
desperately needed WALL at the Southern Border and an END to the horrible Chain Migration
& ridiculous Lottery System of Immigration etc.”); Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump),
TWITTER (Jan. 23, 2018, 8:07 PM), https://goo.gl/Zz46iq (“[I]f there is no Wall, there is no
DACA.”).
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V. ANALYSIS
A. The Department of Homeland Security’s Decision to Wind Down
DACA is Judicially Reviewable
The Supreme Court should review DACA’s rescission because
neither Chaney nor BLE prohibit it, and review is consistent with
administrative law objectives repeatedly noted by the Court. Chaney
identifies one exception to the default rule favoring judicial review of
agency action: the case in which when an agency exercises its discretion
to not take certain enforcement actions.145 This is consistent with the
narrow set of actions committed to agency discretion because agency
inaction is not typically proscribed by statute, so “there is no law to
apply.”146 However, the Court explicitly did not answer whether agency
inaction based “solely on the belief that [the agency] lacks jurisdiction”
would fall within the scope of this exception.147 This is a logical
reservation, as such action involves a non-discretionary interpretation
of the substantive law, which is outside the purview of agency
expertise.148 Unlike agency inaction rooted in a lack of statutory
guidance, it is “almost ludicrous to suggest that there is ‘no law to apply’
in reviewing whether an agency has reasonably interpreted a law.”149
Therefore, these questions of law should be reserved for the courts.150
Similarly, this argument does not conflict with the proposition in
BLE that “otherwise unreviewable” agency actions stand even when
an agency provides a reviewable justification.151 In BLE, the Court
deemed the action “otherwise unreviewable” because of a “tradition”
of nonreviewability similar to that in Chaney.152 However, the Court
has explicitly stated that the tradition in Chaney does not encompass
agency inaction based solely on the agency’s belief that it lacked
authority to do otherwise.153 For BLE to apply, the Court would need
to find a separate tradition of nonreviewability for the type of inaction
at hand. This seems unlikely, given that the basis for deference is often
145. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 823 (1985).
146. Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971); see also Chaney,
470 U.S. at 830 (“[R]eview is not to be had if the statute is drawn so that a court would have no
meaningful standard against which to judge the agency’s exercise of discretion.”).
147. Chaney, 470 U.S. at 833 n.4.
148. Regents of Univ. Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 908 F.3d 476, 495 (9th Cir. 2018).
149. Int’l Union v. Brock, 783 F.2d 237, 246 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (emphasis in original).
150. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012).
151. ICC v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs, 482 U.S. 270, 283 (1987).
152. Id. at 282–83.
153. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 833 n.4 (1985).
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rooted in a “complicated balancing of factors . . . peculiarly within [the
agency’s] expertise.”154 Here, DHS cited no policy issues to balance.155
At issue is whether the Texas cases156 required DHS to rescind DACA,
and such “questions of law” are generally reserved to the expertise of
the courts.157 Altogether, given that there is likely no legal barrier to
judicial review, the “strong presumption favoring judicial review of
administrative action” should apply here.158
B. The Department of Homeland Security’s Decision to Wind Down
DACA was Unlawful
It is less clear whether DHS’s decision to rescind DACA was illegal,
especially in light of the Texas cases and the possibility that the Court
will decide that DACA’s effectuation was illegal regardless. However,
the case does raise concerns about the lack of clarity and transparency
in DHS’s justification.
The analysis in the previous section is dependent on DHS
rationalizing DACA’s rescission solely on the belief that it is illegal.159
DHS argues that this is not the case.160 DHS insists that DACA was
rescinded due to “litigation risks,” but these risks are not mentioned at
all in the Duke Memorandum.161 Though the Sessions Letter makes
reference to potential litigation reaching “similar results” to the Texas
cases, the rest of the letter indicates that this is not an independent
reason for the rescission but merely a natural consequence of DACA’s
supposed illegality.162 The only clear rationale asserted in the Sessions
Letter is that DACA was effectuated without authority and is
fundamentally unconstitutional.163 Further, the Duke Memorandum
cites only this letter and the Texas cases in its one-sentence
justification.164 As Regents point out, this is alarming considering that
154. Id. at 831–32.
155. See supra Part I.A (explaining that Duke’s only rationales for the rescission were the
Texas cases and the Sessions Letter). DHS argues that this is not the case. See infra Part V.B
(discussing the merits of DHS’s argument).
156. See infra Part V.B (laying out the Texas cases addressing the legality of DAPA and
proposed expansions to DACA).
157. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012).
158. Mach Mining, LLC v. EEOC, 135 S. Ct. 1645, 1651 (2015) (quoting Bowen v. Mich.
Acad. of Fam. Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 670 (1986)).
159. See supra Part V.A.
160. See supra Part IV.A.
161. Regents of Univ. Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 908 F.3d 476, 501 (9th Cir. 2018)
162. Id.
163. Brief for the Respondents, supra note 9, at 8.
164. Id. at 9.
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no court has ever found a deferred action policy unconstitutional, no
comparison of DACA and DAPA was provided, and the reasoning
behind these determinations was not explained.165
Therefore, as articulated in the Sessions Letter and the Duke
Memorandum, the rationale behind the rescission cannot rise to the
level of clarity and “reasoned decisionmaking” required by the APA.166
The reasoning provided is not sufficient to allow for real “scrutin[y] by
courts and the general public” because it offers no insight into DHS’s
decision-making process.167 Therefore, the rescission should be held
arbitrary and capricious under the APA.
DHS argues these defects are cured by the Nielsen Memorandum’s
expanded explanation;168 however, Secretary Nielsen’s post hoc
rationalizations are not merited under the APA and should be excluded
from consideration. In violation of one of the foundational principles
of administrative law,169 the Nielsen Memorandum was not issued
contemporaneously with the decision to rescind DACA.170
Additionally, even if the memorandum can be considered necessary for
a fuller explanation, its explanation impermissibly exceeds the
reasoning identified in the Duke Memorandum: namely the illegality
of DACA and its parallels to DAPA.171
Additionally, DHS’s argument that the Nielsen Memorandum was
itself agency action fails because it is an overbroad interpretation of the
principle in Martin.172 In Martin, the then-Secretary’s interpretation of
an ambiguous law was considered agency action only because the thenSecretary was statutorily proscribed the power to interpret the
meaning of agency rules.173 This is inapplicable because there is no
statute granting the Secretary of Homeland Security the power to
retroactively justify already explained agency actions. Regardless, even
if the Nielsen Memorandum is considered, two of its three rationales
depend on the supposed illegality of DACA and the third is not

165. Id. at 8–9.
166. See supra Part II.B.
167. Brief for the Respondents, supra note 9, at 8–9 (quoting Dep’t of Commerce v. New
York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2575–76 (2019)).
168. See supra Part IV.A.
169. See supra Part II.C. (quoting Dep’t of Commerce v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2573
(2019)).
170. Brief for the Respondents, supra note 9, at 28.
171. See supra Part II.C.
172. See supra Part II.B.2.
173. Martin v. Occupational Safety and Health Rev. Comm’n, 499 U.S. 144, 152 (1991).
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presented as independently sufficient grounds for rescission.174
Accordingly, the Nielsen Memorandum presents the same defects as
the Duke Memorandum and does not rise to the level of clarity and
rationalism required by the APA.175
On a policy level, Regents accurately note that post hoc
explanations are especially problematic “where, as here, courts have
found that the administrative record is incomplete.”176 If DHS’s
explanations are not found to be arbitrary and capricious, the Court
should order the record be made complete in compliance with the
APA.177 The Court should not allow DHS to “manipulate judicial
review by changing the rationale for its decisions while withholding the
full administrative record that was before the original
decisionmaker.”178 By affirming review over a complete and clear
record, the Court will promote the Executive Branch’s accountability,
ensure political oversight over federal agencies, and affirm the
fundamental, democratic obligations the Executive owes to the
public.179
CONCLUSION
DHS based its rescission of DACA on a claim that it was required
to do so by law instead of rescinding it on policy grounds. In doing so,
DHS stripped itself of the protections typically afforded to agency
decisions. The rationale DHS has put forth is too limited to be clearly
understandable and offers such insufficient evidence of its decisionmaking that the rescission should be deemed arbitrary and capricious.
For these reasons, the Supreme Court should affirm the injunction
against DHS. This would force DHS to either reattempt the rescission
as a matter of clear policy or let DACA remain in place.

174. See Brief for the Respondents, supra note 9, at 29 (arguing that Nielsen’s statement that
DHS should only enforce laws enforced by Congress rests on a legal conclusion regarding
DACA’s inconsistency with said laws, that Nielsen’s statement that DHS should implement
deferred action on an individualized basis rests on a conclusion that DACA cannot be applied in
such a manner, and that Nielsen’s “messaging” rationale is not presented as an independent
justification for rescission).
175. See supra Part II.B.
176. Brief for the Respondents, supra note 9, at 29.
177. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012).
178. Brief for the Respondents, supra note 9, at 28.
179. See Regents of Univ. Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 908 F.3d 476, 498 (9th Cir.
2018) (noting that judicial review over Executive action is essential for democratic responsiveness
and public accountability).

